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In Taiwan, there are sufficient supplies and well-trained medical professional manpower to be mobilized during disas-
ters. Also known and famous in the world are Taiwan’s well established and fully equipped medical delivery system 
and the public health system. These are high level, enthusiastic, experienced medical staff. However, vulnerable 
areas subjected to disasters in Taiwan are often located at the remote mountain sites, and most victims are aborigi-
nals. These people are viewed as marginalized with inferiority within the power hierarchy. This study surveyed the 
conflicts of public health administration during Typhoon Morakot disaster in 2009. Since disasters destroyed local 
endogenous social relationships, the rescue actions of mobilization and postdisaster reconstruction were under the 
exogenous efforts with “mercy” hegemony. Ethical issues came from the power struggle and practice, and all showed 
explicit control and suppression characters.
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Introduction
Taiwan is located at the Asian subtropical area, with 
mountain area covered two-thirds. In the past, 
there were as many as 3−4 typhoons coming across 
Taiwan. Every typhoon bring Taiwan heavy rain fall 
with some flood in the mountain area. Typhoon 
Morakot with 3000 mm rain fall in around 48 hours 
tremendously damaged southern Taiwan on August 
8−9th, 2009 and induced floods with mudslides in the 
mountain area of Kaohsiung State. It is the heaviest 
rain fall in a single typhoon in Taiwan history.
While the typhoon damaged southern Taiwan, the 
government of Kaohsiung state initiated the rescue 
actions. The rapid response of the public health sys-
tem successfully and effectively satisfied physical 
trauma care needs during the emergent and urgent 
period of the disaster, via massive mobilization of 
health care personnel and supplies under well 
structure public health system. The rescue program 
of the public health system was established imme-
diately to supply and maintain the health care needs 
in the disaster associated damages. There were 
statistical reports on disease monitoring, living envi-
ronment monitoring, public health education activity 
and health screening reports from the working sta-
tions setup in the rural area and every shelter. The 
directing center of the Health Bureau held a daily 
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meeting to judge the needs of the refugees, to 
monitor the refugees’ health state, to resolve the 
difficulties and conflicts of the public health admin-
istration, and to launch new programs for the dif-
ferent stages of the postdisaster rescue policy. The 
Health Bureau also cooperated closely with Kaohsiung 
Emergent Operation Center to recruit and arrange 
the medical care manpower for the disaster dam-
aged area. This study is to review the processes 
and outcome of the public health of the disaster to 
exam the discrepancy and its ethical effects.
Materials and Methods
The study was designed to collect and review the 
official records and documents of the rescuing pro-
grams and the directing center of the Health Bureau 
of Kaohsiung State and its subsystem organizations 
during the flood emergent and urgent periods. 
Included were the meetings records, working diaries, 
statistical results of the disaster associated epide-
miology, various working programs, formal docu-
ments of the departments of the Health Bureau. 
There were a total of 25 items of the official records 
and documents obtained. Characters and main 
themes of the disaster issues of the associated 
public health system activities were retrieved and 
revealed.
Review of several focus groups on the personnel’s 
experience were performed to reveal and reexam-
ine the actual processes of the disaster work about 
6−9 months after the Morakot disaster. The main 
issues discussed in the focus groups were the prob-
lems of the rescue work they experienced and 
their suggestions of further preparation for the dis-
aster associated rescue programs. There were medi-
cal doctors, public health nurses, volunteers, mental 
health counselors, administrators, assistants who 
were invited to attend the focus groups.
Both the contexts and opinions of the records, 
documents and interviewed personnel’s texts were 
theme-categorized and crossed checked. All the 
dos and don’ts were extracted and their meanings 
condensed and examined.
Results
In this study, the contexts and opinions of the records, 
documents and personnel’s interviewed texts showed 
the whole picture and a comprehensive process of 
the disaster associated rescue performance. The 
rescue work of medical care during the typhoon 
Morakot flood disaster in the Kaohsiung state 
began at the time when the first medical team 
were taken by the first helicopter to the isolated 
village in the mountain areas. It was the dawn of 
August 11th, just after the peak flood flow, but still 
during rather unstable weather conditions. There 
were many isolated villages in the mountain areas 
where roads and bridges were severely damaged. 
Worse, the communication was also destroyed during 
the flood with almost no information available dur-
ing August 8th and 9th, the first and second days of 
the typhoon Morakot flood disaster. With compro-
mised medical resources and limited food supply, 
people in the villages of disaster area needed emer-
gent air mobilization to safety area. From August 
11th to 18th, there were a total of 374 flights of 
helicopters with 5721 persons taken from the isolated 
villages, and then the day with the most number 
of flights was August 14th as 119 flights took 1984 
refugees to safety. Among them, 38 staff of 23 
medical teams were sent to the isolated villages via 
helicopter transportation for the emergent care of 
the injured refugees trapped in these areas. All 
the refugees were first taken to Chi-San Rescue 
Site at the Chi-Shan town in the mountain area of 
Kaohsiung State but outside the disaster-damaged 
area and than allocated to further medical care or 
to the shelters, which were at first set up tempo-
rally at 19 temples and churches, and then relocated 
to four military camps about 2 weeks later.
The public health system started to work at the 
very beginning of the disaster. There were three 
medical centers and three more mid-sized hospitals 
in the Kaohsiung area. All the hospitals were super-
vised by the medical system of National Institute 
of Health, instead of being publicly or privately 
funded. According to the disaster information noted 
from the mountain area, the Health Bureau of 
Kaohsiung State organized a directing center to 
arrange the medical staffs for on-site recue service. 
Under the directing center of the Health Bureau, 
there were five health centers of the towns dam-
aged by the flood, a frontline work station of Chi-
San Rescue Site, and later a public heath provision 
and supervision system of infectious control and 
monitoring, water and food hygiene, medical care 
for the 19 temporal shelters at temples and 
churches, and four military camps. In the mean 
time, the well-established public health system 
also began to survey the living and health condi-
tion and followed up of the people registered in 
the managed diseases programs, such as tubercu-
losis, HIV, mental diseases, suicide, Methadone 
Maintenance Therapy and long-term care.
The main approach of the disaster medicine ex-
tracted from themes of the study materials clearly 
showed that the church-based and tribe-oriented 
approach was the main theme in the public health 
system during this disaster. However disaster associ-
ated physical injuries were obvious and received 
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immediate care at the beginning, and mental trauma 
and other psychological stress received little atten-
tion till later due to the ignorance or lack of support 
from the Department of Health of the central govern-
ment. Only after the disaster emergency, programs 
for the traumatic mental health problems were 
launched according to the basic doctrines as tribute-
based church-oriented rules. The official documents 
and reports showed that those doctrines were set 
up by the local health bureau due to the consider-
ation that most of the refugees were at the state 
as minority, aboriginal people at the low socio-
economic, marginalized state. Mental health pro-
fessional staff was recruited and briefly trained 
on the culture- and power-sensitive approaches 
for the victims. In addition, volunteers were also 
recruited and organized from the refugees in the 
disaster damaged area. Most of those volunteers 
were the key persons in the tributes or villages; 
they were trained and did the very first screening 
work of mental health problems, especially post-
traumatic stress disorder, depression, alcoholism and 
domestic violence. Positive findings of possible disas-
ter associated mental health problems of the refu-
gees were noted via screening questions incorporated 
in the daily usual talk between the trained volun-
teers or the mental health professional staffs and 
victims. Once indentified, further psychological 
cares such as individual interviews, family inter-
views, small group activities, large group psycho-
education, children play therapy or geriatric narrative 
activity were performed according to needs.
As we learned from the whole disaster associ-
ated rescue activities, all these rescue programs 
mainly focused on the biomedical needs of refugees, 
and most of the needs were presumed and designed 
by the extrinsic resources applied to the disaster 
damaged area. Minor aspects of the needs were noted 
from the refugees, and later their opinions further 
augmented the biomedical mainstreaming of the 
public health administration, such as 24-hour medical 
care service in the earlier temporal shelters and the 
later military camps instead of medical services 
being available at a 5-minute distance from most of 
the refugees’ temporal housing. The medical service 
records showed that not more than 15 patients vis-
ited the medical station in the temporal housing in a 
day, and 5−10 patients in most of the days. Also noted 
was the transportation service used for the refugees’ 
medication needs. There was daily transportation 
service from the temporal housing to Chi-Shan town, 
which was 60-minute away for some 10−20 refu-
gees’ doctor’s visit, due to their pre-disaster medical 
care experience and chronic conditions, such as 
gout, hypertension and diabetes mellitus.
The in-depth interviews revealed that though 
during the Morakot flood the medical health care 
and disaster associated public health service were 
rather sufficient and well-structured; tremendous 
medical manpower and supplies were mobilized to 
satisfy any presumed needs “created” by the “would 
rather more than less” medical administration. 
Worse, the so-called and pretended rapid and accu-
rate medical response to the disaster did not have 
psycho-social care action accompanying the medical 
personnel’s activity. The overwhelming life-saving 
and physical trauma needing medical care received 
most of the attention of the public health system, 
in addition to the strict infectious control and other 
public hygiene needs.
Noted from this study, mental health service took 
place not only late in the urgent period of the disas-
ter but also in an incoherent approach. The disaster 
associated mental health issues were not shown in 
the daily meeting records or the doctrines and the 
standard of procedures of the public health system. 
Owning to the long term disaster adverse effects 
and the reconstruction needs, mental health service 
in the public health mobilization of typhoon Morakot 
flood disaster is dealt with at the later stage. And 
this can explain the chaos and the inconsistent ser-
vices of mental health in the period of reconstruction 
post disaster. This came to skew the phenomenon 
that could describe the submissive integration of 
mental health services in the public health activi-
ties of the Morakot disaster.
From the records and documents, we knew that 
Mao-lin village of Kaohsiung state was also located 
in the mountain area with flood damage with deaths 
in that disaster. However, sightseeing with famous 
springs was the major economic activity in Mao-lin 
village. The buildings and roads were almost de-
stroyed and people lived in village were heavily 
hurt by the environmental damage and subsequent 
economic decline. According to the records and 
documents, Mao-lin village was the last place where 
medical help arrived, and the last where mental 
health programs was launched, and possibly where 
the least resources were supplied. Compared with 
other areas, this might give rise to the notion that 
those who were hurt most got the most.
Discussion
In the past, reflection of the politics of disaster pro-
claimed that the rescue activities frequently showed 
the extrinsic power to destructively replace the in-
trinsic ability of the refugees and aboriginal tributes’ 
function.1 Because most of the victims were aborigi-
nals and the minority, they were marginalized with 
inferiority within the power hierarchy before the 
disaster and even more marginalized after the dis-
aster.2 To meet the medical care needs without 
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consideration of the power influence created by 
the unrealistic, pious, enthusiastic mercy actions 
of medical systems and aggravated the depend-
ence of the victims.2,3 This surely was, is, and will be 
unethical and undoubtedly made up the secondary 
disaster with the powerless victims with their end-
less dependency. This is an unconscious attempt to 
obtain the superiority of the social mainstream state 
via keeping the victims persistently victimized for 
good.4
From the very beginning of the Typhoon Morakot 
flood disaster in Taiwan, both the rapid response 
of medical teams and subsequent public health in-
tervention only dealt with physical injuries. This 
led to the very distant and loose integration of the 
mental health service to public health. The disrup-
tion of comprehensive bio-psychosocial module was 
unavoidable in that such situations required imme-
diate medical action for physical harm.2 The pub-
lic health doctrines became a gold standard in the 
relationships of this new hierarchy, built naturally 
to control the loss.4 And of course, the aftermath 
recovery and reconstruction were not the main 
concepts at the first glance, and biological first 
aid needs not only came into the spot prominently, 
but also disconnected with psycho-socio-cultural-
spiritual needs.5 The hegemony of the public health 
and medical care system surely constructed the 
efficient-valued scientifically based hierarchy for 
the disaster associated service.1,2,6 Under this neo-
doctrine, in the name of mercy, people were cared 
only because of their physical damage and this 
led the socially marginalized and inferior to more 
dependence.7 Any area or people without signifi-
cant physical damage or injuries were marginal-
ized or forgotten in the scope of the distribution 
of resources.8 This unrelenting power use without 
reflection distorted the reconstruction from the dis-
aster and incarcerated the people in the disaster 
circumstances.1,2,8
The ethical issues of disaster medicine raised 
from this study imply that lack of cohesive and inte-
grated rescue working training and notification led 
to the worsening of power imbalance in the original 
social hierarchy.4,5 Physical care was not enough 
but rather deviant for disaster injuries. That was 
due to the fact that once being labeled as physical 
victims with little mental intention, people used 
to getting more attention and resources from the 
rescue work, and entered a vicious cycle to be hin-
dered from the reconstruction and recovery.9 These 
unsatisfying consequences raised the question of 
“who are the insiders?” From the rescue team’s 
stance, doing something good for the victims 
of the disaster was the main duty, but the reasons 
for doing something good were from people of 
power and denied the victims’ autonomy. And the 
reconstruction was designed and directed by the 
people with pious mercy at the higher part of 
the hierarchy.
By political correctness, mental health was pre-
sumed important.5 But in fact the disrupted public 
health work in the disaster treated mental health 
as an appendix, due to the implicit ideology of bio-
medical hegemony.6,9 This implies that a new model 
of bio-psycho-social base is needed to integrate 
mental care of the first response of public health 
system.9 Medical school education programs should 
be reformed as followings: a balance and fusion of 
bio-medicine and mental health, power-sensitive 
attitudes and skills, cooperation caring without 
domination, efficient communication strategy for 
the marginalized, de-professionalism in the fields. 
The new paradigm requires that the critical timing 
to launch the post disaster mental health care to 
be as early as the first time of the emergent public 
health response, and become more prominent in 
the later phase of reconstruction.
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